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Gromyko, Andreĭ Andreevich, 1909Hart, Gary Warren
Herder, Christian
Hughes, Charles Evans, 1862-1948
Hull, Cordell, 1871-1955
Hussein, King of Jordan, 1935-1999
Hussein, Saddam, 1937Jackson, Henry M. (Henry Martin), 1912-1983
Jefferson, Thomas, 1743-1826
Kennedy, Edward Moore, 1932Kissinger, Henry, 1923Lewis, Samuel W. (Samuel Winfield), 1930Linowitz, Sol M., 1913Mitchell, George J. (George John), 1933Mudd, Roger, 1928Muskie, Edmund S., 1914-1996
Muskie, Jane Gray
Nixon, Richard M. (Richard Milhous), 1913-1994
Picker, Arnold
Pol Pot
Reagan, Ronald
Rogers, William P. (William Pierce), 1913-2001
Rusk, Dean, 1909-1994
Tito, Josip Broz, 1892-1980
Udall, Morris K.
Vance, Cyrus R. (Cyrus Roberts), 1917-2002
Waldheim, Kurt
Washington, George, 1732-1799
Williams, Edward Bennett

Transcript

Chris Beam: ... meeting which takes place on August 16, 1990 at 9:00 AM. Senator Muskie, I
wanted to, ah, Secretary of State Muskie, I wanted to ask you, get this discussion going, about
the circumstances of your appointment as Secretary of State in the spring of 1980. When was
the first inkling, what was the first inkling you had that President Carter was considering you as
Secretary of State?
Edmund S. Muskie: Well, the first knowledge I had was when he asked me to become
Secretary of State. I was not aware that there was a vacancy at the time, I’d been traveling
across the country, campaigning in Arizona for Morris [K.] Udall, Colorado for Gary Hart, and I
was on my way to Nashville, Tennessee to make a speech on water pollution. And on the way,
when the plane stopped in St. Louis, there was a . . . I got notice that the White House was
calling. I got off the plane and returned the call, but the White House switchboard did not know
who it was who was trying to reach me. So I went on to Nashville and there was a call at the
airport there, too, and the same thing. I called the White House switchboard and they didn’t
know who was trying to reach me. Incredibly. It wasn’t until late that evening, about eleven
o’clock, when I had completed my speech in Nashville that I returned to my hotel room and the
President reached me there.1
Even at that point I did not know there was a vacancy so I didn’t know that he was considering
me. I thought maybe he was calling me about a possible fishing trip in Maine. I knew he was,
he was a rabid fisherman and we had talked about fishing, so I thought maybe that’s why he was
calling. It was spring after all. But then suddenly he asked me if I would be his Secretary of
State. It came as a, like a bolt out of the blue. I was, as I say, I wasn’t aware there was a
vacancy, let alone that he was considering me. So I think there was a noticeable silence for a
few seconds and he asked me what I thought of it and I said, well, it had some appeal but that I’d
have to think about it, and so he asked me, “What,” you know, “what, how much time I would
have to have and I said, “Well, I’ve got to talk to my accountant, I’ve got to talk to my wife, I’ve
got to talk to the governor of the state and make up my own mind.” So we agreed that we would
discuss it the next day, that I would return to Washington and then let him know. But he, he
called me at six o’clock the next morning, when I was still in Nashville in my hotel room, said he
was on his way to Texas and he could stop and pick me up so that we could talk on the way to
Texas, and I told him really I didn’t have to talk to him, I had to talk to my wife and my
accountant and so on, and so on. So we agreed that after I’d done that the next day I would, I
would get in touch with him.
But the only factor that was unfinished by the time I had talked to my accountant, I wanted to,
because I understood my income would be sharply reduced. I’d have to cut off my lecture,
lecture schedule, and that was an important source of income to me in those days, and also I
would not get the full salary of a Cabinet member because I had voted for the most recent
increase. So I had to go over my finances very carefully. And I had done that and we agreed
1

A section called “Trips” in the miscellaneous index binder to the collection (SE 3117) is where to find a listing for the
trip that included Arizona, Colorado and Nashville, Tennessee from April 25-28, 1980. The speech index lists the
Nashville speech as April 28, 1980 on the subject of Earth Day and the Clean Water Act. This speech can be found at
the following location in the collection: SE 3224 (last speech in last folder).

that I could probably manage for the rest of that year at least, through the election and until the
end of Carter’s term. And my wife was thoroughly in agreement with my taking the, taking the
appointment. But then I had to get in touch with the governor, because I wanted to protect my
staff and I wanted to ask the governor to. . . . Well, in the first place, I think as a courtesy to him,
since he had to make the appointment to fill the vacancy, he ought to know anyway. But I
wanted him to take up with my successor, whoever he might appoint, the matter of keeping my
staff at least until the election. So I called the governor the next day, I didn’t tell him what it was
about because he was having a dinner at the governor’s mansion with a number of newspaper
reporters, and I didn’t want him spreading the word, so I arranged to meet him at the Brunswick
Naval Air Station the next day. . . . the President made a White House plane available to me.
Came up to Brunswick, discussed the matter with him. He was thoroughly supportive. He went
over his list of possible candidates with me to get my reaction. I told him that really it was his
decision to make. I was sure he’d be interested in appointing someone whom he believed to be
qualified, but that was his decision. I declined to give my reaction to any proposal he had. And
he of course would be running for reelection himself, so he ought to be concerned about the
pulling power of the senatorial candidate.
CB: Now, when you said that you were not aware that there was a vacancy, had the aborted
military raid to rescue the hostages taken place?
EM: Oh, yes. That, as a matter of fact, [Cyrus] Vance had submitted his resignation to the
president before the raid took place because he disagreed with that decision. But he agreed to
withhold his resignation until the attempt had been made. But the raid had been made, and it had
failed, well, the raid that had been attempted had failed. Uh, and the news of his resignation had
been made public, because Jane had heard about it back home. The White House had been
calling her to find out where I was, and they didn’t tell her why, why the president was trying to
get hold of me, but she guessed correctly what it was. So the raid, yeah, the raid was history and
the resignation had been submitted and made public, but it simply had escaped my notice
because I was busy traveling. So then I notified the, the governor had given me his assurance
that he would try to protect my staff, and out of our discussion he ultimately offered the
appointment to Senator Mitchell. And although Mitchell had been appointed District Judge and
had been serving about six months, he was more than eager to take the appointment, so that it all
worked out pretty well.
CB: Now, in 1980 you were a well-respected senior member of the United States Senate and it
was clear in the spring of 1980 that the Carter administration was in deep trouble over the Iran
hostage crisis.
EM: And inflation.
CB: And inflation. But, I mean, the administration was getting really a double whammy and
clearly foreign policy was the major problem. Did you have any sense of trepidation about
leaving the Senate to go to the State Department, to join an administration that was in deep
political trouble over a major foreign policy crisis?
EM: No, not really. In the first place, in the first place, to be asked by a president, you know, to

assume this particular position in the circumstances, you know, a crisis, you know, I regard as a
distinct honor and one that I couldn’t lightly say no to. I mean, it was obviously a very serious
matter from the country’s point of view, as well as the president’s political point of view, so I
took that into account. But in addition, I had long believed that I would not want to run for
reelection after I reached the age of seventy. Well, my next election I would have been, let’s see,
this would have been in ‘82, I would have been sixty-eight. So that, to run again wouldn’t have
violated my principle, if you can call it a principle. But in addition to that, the financial burden
of being in the Senate was becoming very heavy, and I wasn’t sure I wanted to run for another
term. But I felt that if I stayed in the Senate that I would be pressured to run again, because
people would probably conclude that if I didn’t run, we might lose that seat as a party and that I
might yield to the pressure to run again when I really thought the time had come when I probably
should not.
So Carter’s invitation really gave me a graceful way to avoid that decision, and to have the
experience of serving as Secretary of State in these unusual circumstances, so it looked to me
like an opportunity. I realized that he could lose the election and that my tenure would be eight
short months, but that didn’t really trouble me. I would have liked to have served for another
Carter term as president, but that isn’t the way the ball bounced. So I have no regrets today that I
did it, and had no qualms about doing it then. There was something of an effort made, you
know, to persuade me, to allow my name to be put in, nomination, at the convention for
president as Carter’s political problems deepened in the course of the next months. But I
discouraged that, absolutely.
CB: Who made these efforts, these, put out these feelers?
EM: Well, it was a number of people. I don’t really know who the ringleaders were, but there
were a number of people. I know Edward Bennett Williams worked, did a lot of work trying to
do that. I had discussions with him. Arnold Picker, who had been a strong supporter in ‘72, and
who had contributed a great, a lot of money to that campaign. There were others. My memory
is not as sharp as it ought to be on the names. They also tried, I think there was some effort
made to try to persuade Senator [Henry M.] Jackson [D-WA] to lend his name to that effort. I
think money was raised for such an effort.
CB: You mean before they contacted you about the possibility ...
EM: Well, this was sort of an ongoing effort for a few, I mean, they never got any
encouragement from me at all, but that did not discourage them from pursuing it so that I was
aware of it, the press was aware of it. I, over a period of a couple of months there, I couldn’t
avoid the question from time to time from the press as to whether or not I was interested or
whether or not I would accept. And I’d made it clear from the beginning that when I said yes to
the president’s invitation to appoint me to the job, that implicitly I was renouncing it, although I
had no idea when he offered me the appointment that there would be this little boomlet. But it
occurred and if I had had any inclination to seek the presidency at that time, I certainly wouldn’t
have accepted the appointment.
CB: Now, this boomlet occurred when? Just before ...?

EM: Before the election, before the convention. When was the convention?
CB: Oh, I see, while you were Secretary of State.
EM: While I was secretary of state, oh yeah. I mean, I was appointed in May and the
convention was, what, August? In August?
CB: I think so.
EM: So it was in that period. It wasn’t a very long period. But I got off to a good start as
Secretary of State. The reaction to my appointment was very positive everywhere that I could
see, and so it was natural, I guess, the Kennedy candidacy hadn’t really gotten off the ground.
He’d run into trouble, particularly because of his unfortunate interview with Roger Mudd. You
remember that interview that. . . .
CB: I remember it, but I don’t remember all the details. . . .
EM: Mudd asked him why he was running for president, and Kennedy fumbled badly on his
answer to that question. As I remember it, it was quite, a very visible political setback for
Kennedy, the fact that he didn’t really know why he was running. So his candidacy hadn’t
gotten off the ground. There was, I don’t think there was any real doubt that Carter would get
the nomination at the convention, but there were those who thought that another candidacy at
that point, myself or Jackson, might succeed and put the party in a stronger position.
CB: Now, in the CBS documentary, CBS, WCSH documentary on you, your wife Jane also
commented that in 1980 you had reached a kind of emotional dead end as far as the Senate was
concerned. That you had, you felt that you were ready to move on in terms of what you could
accomplish within the Senate, that you felt frustrated and that this offer of the Secretary of State
position was really kind of a windfall. To what extent did you feel as though you had reached a
kind of peak in the Senate?
EM: Well, I don’t know that I felt that, although she may have read my mood better than I did.
I mean, I found it a very welcome event for the reasons I’ve already given you, but in terms of
losing enthusiasm for work in the Senate, I don’t recall that I had reached that point. There
really wasn’t much in terms of advancement in a political sense that was left to me except, you
know, continue to do a job as a senator.
The budget process was still very much under challenge. We’d done a good job, I think. At the
time I left the Senate we had reduced the national, the deficit to something like twenty-billion
dollars. Contrast that with the present two-hundred, two-hundred and fifty-billion dollars. So,
we thought we had taken that process pretty well along the road to success but it was still under,
it was still being tested. There was still a lot to be done to improve it and to solidify it and to
really make it’s impact. I think the Reagan administration in effect destroyed the potential
effectiveness of that budget process. It’s been substituted, in fact, by the Gramm-RudmanHollings law, which to me isn’t a process at all. It’s an artificial cap on the deficit that it is easy

for Congress to evade. And the trouble with it is that it didn’t really, it doesn’t really address the
issue of what our priorities are to be in spending. I mean, you can’t, if you just put an arbitrary
top to your deficit, then there’s the, you know, the priorities question which is the really tough
budget problem, the priorities. You know, what interests do you serve with government
resources? Education, health, environment, defense? As you know, the budget all too often
develops as a contest between those who believe in social spending of one kind or another, and
those who believe in defense. Well, that’s an oversimplification, really, of what it is. But the
first group is divided among a lot of sub groups: those interested in education, those interested in
health, those interested in environment, those interested in jobs and so on. So there’s a lot of
work still to be done on the budget process, and I thought we had done very well on my side.
Senator Henry Bellman of Oklahoma, who was in effect the Republican manager of the Senate
Budget Committee, and I had worked well together and I think we’d achieved considerable
success and I think we would have continued to if I had stayed on.
So I didn’t feel really that we had exhausted the challenges to me personally of that process, and
of course the environmental process hadn’t come to a dead end. It was growing and, as you
know, it is even a bigger issue today than it was when I left the Senate ten years ago. So my
areas of interest were still very much alive, but in the sense, I was uneasy about, maybe that’s
what Jane interpreted to mean that I was tired of the Senate or it opportunities. I felt very much
burdened by our financial condition and wondered how long we could sustain our family and
educate our kids and all the rest of it. So in that sense perhaps I reflected a mood that persuaded
her that I really wasn’t getting much more satisfaction out of the job. That’s a rambling answer.
CB: That’s fine. One question that came to mind was, right after your swearing in as Secretary
of State, I’m curious as to what particular steps you took to assimilate yourself into the job under
very unusual circumstances. You were obviously faced with the Iran hostage crisis, not to
mention the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, plus the usual, all the other issues that would face
a Secretary of State. What particular steps, concrete steps, did you take or were taken for you to
get you into the job in May of 1980?
EM: Well, of course I was a member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at the time and
had been for a number of years so at least from a Senate point of view, I was involved in all of
the visible issues, or the active issues, so I suppose I had that background which someone who
hadn’t been in the position wouldn’t have had. And of course we had to plunge immediately
into, you know, I had to plunge immediately into the management of foreign policy across the
board. That’s one of the advantages of the State Department, the Foreign Service people in the
State Department of course ensure that there’s continuity in the State Department and foreign
policy on an ongoing basis. And I knew a lot of those people, and so I plunged in and I didn’t
have to, I didn’t have the option of putting together a team in the State Department to, that
reflected my priorities. That team was in place.
And the first important decision I made there that I think was a response to your question, was
the deputy secretary of state. Warren Christopher had definitely been an approp-, been under
consideration as, or on the list of those who were, deserved and got consideration for the
appointment as secretary. And I knew Chris, admired him tremendously, and he, before I talked
to him, had decided I think to leave the State Department and I persuaded him to stay. And that I

think was very important in terms, because Chris and I developed a very good personal
relationship. And he was my immediate key to tying in to all of the ongoing issues and the
management of the State Department. He was an invaluable assistant.
And Vance had assembled a very good team of people in the top spots, the top leadership spots
in the State Department, and we established a working relationship immediately. And I think it
was helpful that I was prepared to accept the personnel structure as it was. I just accepted them
and I told them so. I said, look, you’ve got to take me in this crisis, in these circumstances, this
emergency, as I am, and I’m prepared to take you, too, so let’s work together. There was never
any, I left no doubt whatsoever that I wasn’t looking, you know, for patronage positions to put
people into, that I was willing to take the State Department as it was. And I think that worked
very well. Now, to this day I get the impression that my willingness to do so really created a
positive environment in the State Department that served me, it served the State Department,
served the president and served the country. So they were all there.
They didn’t, they all knew me or of me, and they all respected me for what I had been up to that
point. And the fact that I was willing, you know, to just step right into harness with them to
work eliminated any uncertainty as to their own status or what the impact might be on them
personally, or their position. So we jumped right into harness together and that was, you know I
met, there was a group of eight that I met with every morning at eight o’clock and then once a
week I would meet with people at the assistant secretary or ambassadorial level who were out of
town, and I converted that into a different kind of arrangement. Up to that time, those meetings
were held for the purpose of giving them an opportunity to report to the secretary as to what was
happening in their areas. I converted it into another kind of forum. I used them to test all the
questions that I had to consider at the secretarial level. In other words, I asked for their
judgment on the decisions that I had under consideration and had to deal with. And it was
interesting to watch them react to that. They were not there just to give their own view of their
particular little piece of the pie, but they were there to, you know, I was, I clearly had an interest
in what they thought about the big picture, and it was very helpful.
CB: Now, when you came in, were you given briefing books, piles of documents to sort of
update you on which departments. . . . ?
EM: Oh, this was a daily business, not necessarily related to fact that I had come in and needed
to get caught up. You had to start reading immediately. I mean, the daily input of, because all
these issues are pending on a day-to-day basis and it did involve a lot of reading. The Secretary
of State can’t possibly personally deal with all the cable traffic that moves into the State
Department. So I had good people who screened that to make sure that I got the important
things, the things that I had to absolutely be in touch with, but there were massive amounts of
detail on issues that probably did not come to my attention. And that’s why Christopher’s
position as deputy was important and the seven or eight other positions at that level.
I mean, they all had their share of the cable traffic to deal with and my name went, you ought to
read, the best answer to your question I think is found in Dean Rusk’s new book. He discusses
in great detail the kind of problems a secretary has in dealing with just the total mass of
information that passes through the State Department. The State Department is really a

communications center, you know, this information flowing from around the world twenty four
hours a day and there have to be people who intercept it here, there and elsewhere, make sure
that it all, the key questions get to the secretary’s attention. It’s quite an operation. And of
course, the hostage crises had complicated that. We had a special section dealing with just the
hostage crisis involving some of the spouses of the people who were hostages in Iran. I forget
what that was called. But it worked well.
And of course, so far as my, you know, I had to begin traveling almost immediately. I mean, the
Secretary of State today does even more than we did in those days. But almost immediately
there was, there were meetings in Brussels, NATO ministerial meetings, the Austrian State
Treaty, a celebration in May, there was a Venice economic summit that was approaching in June,
an (unintelligible word) conference in Southeast Asia in late June, and so on. So there wasn’t
much time to sit at my desk in Washington and read reports or cable traffic and whatnot.
CB: One thing, I was looking back over some of the backgrounds of former secretaries of state,
and in a way your background is unusual because you had a career as an elected official, as a
politician, throughout most of your adult life. And that was not the case with Secretary Vance,
Secretary Rusk, Secretary Kissinger, Rogers, the only others that I can think of would be
Christian Herter under Eisenhower, or [Sic] [Charles] Evans Hughs in the 1920s.
EM: Don’t overlook Roosevelt’s secretary of state, Cordell Hull.
CB: Cordell Hull, okay. Do you think this gave you a different perspective than most of your
predecessors in terms of your approach, your relations with Congress, the press, with your
understanding of the dynamics of international relations?
EM: Well, undoubtedly it did. Of course in the early days, you know, at the beginnings of the
Republic, the Secretary of State was a political figure. He was, usually the president, vice
president and secretary of state were perhaps the three most important political figures of their
time, beginning with Washington, Washington, Adams, Jefferson as secretary of state. If you go
through the first fifty or more years of the country’s history, secretary of state was usually
chosen from the ranks of political leaders. And as a matter of fact, by law he was the third in, or
the second in line of succession to the presidency, and I think that was true until after I reached
the Senate. I forget when it was precisely that the line of succession was changed to substitute
the speaker of the house, the President Pro Temp [of the senate] for the Secretary of State on
down. But yes, I think it did in terms of the most recent incumbents of the state department, I
was an exception.
Well, there was Cordell Hull, there was former Senator [James] Byrnes who was secretary after
the war, I guess the three of us. Hull, I guess, came from the House, Byrnes came from the
Senate and I was from the Senate. It did, it, and I think it made a difference in some important
ways. I know [Zbigniew] Brzezinski, you know, who created many problems for [Cyrus] Vance,
had a different view of me, because he understood that one of the reasons that Carter appointed
me was because I had a political base. And in a way that, I don’t want to use the word
intimidated him, but he took it into account in his own assertions of turf, for example. Although
he was never a comfortable person to work with in that respect. We got along personally all

right, although we haven’t had a personal relationship of any kind since I left, since I left public
life.
And of course with respect to the Congress, you know, the Congress respected my, respected me
totally. I never had any troubles with the Congress. I found it easy to communicate with them, I
knew them. And. . . . in my appearances before committees and so on, I felt completely at home
and they responded in kind. And I think even in the State Department and also in my relations
with, you know, my counterparts in other countries, the fact that I came from the Senate I think
added a dimension to my position that was a plus. They regarded me as a political leader of the
country, not just simply as secretary of state, so it was important in very many ways.
No, I felt that my eight months plus as secretary was regarded as a plus and a positive period by
everybody concerned so far as I can see. I never felt that people were disappointed in my
handling of the job. They seemed to be, have a feeling of assurance because I was there, and that
was true wherever I went or whatever group I was with.
CB: Now, you mentioned that you had some problems with national security advisor Zbigniew
Brzezinski. What were some of those problems? Were they turf questions, were there
differences in pers-, philosophical differences, approaches to foreign policy?
EM: Well, there was a, no, the questions of, the questions such as holding press conferences on
foreign policy. There’s nothing that Brzezinski liked more than that limelight and the trouble
with it was that, you know, his articulation of a policy at any point would always be compared
with the secretary’s articulation. And to the extent that people perceived a difference, it creates
confusion. He also met with representatives of other countries. Well, he always felt there was a
temptation for people, representatives from other countries, to shop for the best point of view
they could get. I mean, not that every time he had a press conference and every time he met with
a foreign leader that that necessarily led to a sharp breach between the national security advisor
and the secretary of state, but the potential was there. Of course, reporters who specialized in
foreign policy, who dealt with both, you know, would like to play games with that kind of a
relationship. Now, I don’t think he, I don’t think he did it as much with me as he did with Vance
because he understood this was an election year for the president and the president couldn’t
afford to lose another secretary of state. And besides, this secretary of state had a political
following of his own, so I think that his inclinations along that line cooled somewhat, or he held
them in restraint, for whatever reason. But he still was an abrasive kind of a guy to deal with.
He was very sure of his own opinions. We used to have some, in. . . . we took turns chairing
foreign policy meetings and we used to have some pretty sharp exchanges.
CB: Were these differences over the ...?
EM: The differences over the management of the Middle East, crises, the Afghanistan situation,
the Polish situation. I mean, all of those came up during that eight month period. Never resulted
in any break, it was just, it was just not a very comfortable arrangement. And apparently in
Vance’s case, after three years, he had a belly full, especially on that Afghanistan, on that rescue
mission.

End of Side A
Side B
CB: Okay, concerning the Iran hostage crisis, how did you feel about the military raid when it
occurred? Did you, had you thought it was advisable to even try it? I realize in retrospect it
might because it was aborted, that it might seem a bad idea, but what was your opinion, both as a
senator and once you were in the State Department, about the advisability of this raid?
EM: Well, I felt that, I felt that the president would have been remiss in his response, in the
discharge of his responsibilities if he hadn’t, if he hadn’t planned for a military option. And that
planning did begin, I gather, as soon as the, early on in the hostage crisis. Now, I had not been
briefed on the fact that such planning was going on, or its nature, its components, and I really
had not focused on whether, I hadn’t focused on whether it was under way, or whether there
should be an effort of this kind. But, again, I began by saying that I would have thought it would
have been a mistake not to have planned.
Now, whether or not the plan that was finally developed was the best plan that could have been
put together, I have no military judgment on that. And I was not a part of that planning, I was
not a part of a consideration of options of one kind or another. So the shaping of the plan, I
wasn’t involved in any way whatsoever, and in no position to make a judgment on it. And I
gather it was in the course of that, the development of the plan and the consideration of the
options and the final decisions as to its make up, that Vance’s negative attitude developed. And
I gather that Brzezinski had a great deal of influence on the plan and its components. But,
looking at it from another point of view, at the time that the decision was made to go forward
with the military option, all other options for dealing with the crisis had come to a dead end. The
very last of it involved the United Nations effort through Kurt Waldheim and, you remember,
that was tried and produced no results. Diplomacy had come up against a dead end all across the
board and there were the constant threats, or possibility of threats, from the Iranians about what
might be done with the hostages. Talk of trials, talk of possible death penalty and so on. All of
this was very disturbing for the president.
So, and then, with respect to the military option, this was May, the nights were getting shorter
and night time was obviously an important part of whatever plan you launched. The nights were
getting shorter and with respect to the helicopters and the aircraft, the air was getting warmer and
thinner and less supportive, so that as time went on, the potential viability of the plan that had
been put together was diminishing. So with diplomatic initiative at a dead end and possibilities
of using this option under pressure, the decision was made to launch it. So we lost I think six or
eight men in the process, in Desert One. So my reaction to it publicly at that point, and this was
before I knew that Vance had resigned, the president called us down to the White House to brief
us on it and to tell us what had happened, and of course he was very deeply concerned that it had
failed, I felt that he had no choice but to undertake it. But this is after the fact and without
having been exposed to it in the way that Vance had been.
Now, after the fact, after this thing was all over, I came to believe that the fact that the effort had
been made was one of the factors that may have contributed to the Iranian’s decision to
negotiate. They couldn’t be sure we wouldn’t try again, and they couldn’t be sure that another

effort might be more successful. I don’t know to what extent that may have had an influence on
them, but I, I mean, it was too bad to lose the lives of those six or eight soldiers, but other than
that, the failure of the mission was not that profound. The one negative impact its failure might
have had, or the fact that it was undertaken, might have resulted in the dispersal of the hostages
so that it would have been more difficult to find them in the event of another effort.
CB: Was the military option ever considered again?
EM: No, not to my knowledge. Not to my knowledge. But we certainly didn’t announce to the
world that we weren’t considering it. So they couldn’t be sure that we were not. No, we
absolutely did not consider a repetition of the military option. What we did decide was to wait
for the political developments in Iran to finally produce a government with which we could deal.
And it was in, I think in August of that year that the Madulis, or Parliament, was elected and a
speaker of the Madulis, speaker of the hou-, Madulis was appointed, and it was at that point that
I wrote him a letter indicating that we had mutual problems.
You know, they had been asking us for an apology for all the, for the Shah’s regime, our
contribution to it and all of that, and I simply referred to mutual grievances that we ought to be
discussing. And it wasn’t long after that, I think late August, early September, the dates ought to
be confirmed, I am not sure about this, that we got word through the German foreign minister,
Gentscher, who is still foreign minister, that he’d gotten word from the Iranians that they were
interested in a meeting. And we pursued that and were able to confirm the fact that they were
indeed interested in some kind of talks. And those talks began under the auspices of the West
Germans, in Germany, before the election, and continued through the election and beyond so
that, and those talks are what finally produced the release of the hostages. After the election, the
Algerians saw, the Iranians asked to substitute the Algerians for the West Germans, they felt
more comfortable I guess with the Algerians. So although it wasn’t direct face to face
negotiations, it was negotiation through the Algerian intermediaries.
And of course politically, you know, the Republicans at that time were, you know, trying to
make an issue of two things: one, that you never talk with hostage takers. I don’t know how you
ever resolve those issues unless you talk to hostage takers, but anyway that was the line, the
Republican line at the time. And secondly, the Shah of course had bought and paid for a lot of
military equipment and the Republicans were sure, you know, that we would give that up to get
the hostages, that was another issue, supposed issue. Interesting thing is that we, there was no
discussion between us and the Iranians on the question of those arms. So far as I know, they
never requested them, probably because they didn’t want to be beholden to the great Satan, but
in any case that never arose, and we settled it, settled the matter without dealing with that issue
and I don’t really know what the present condition of those specific arms might be. I would
think there would be a lot of obsolescence.
CB: These are what, planes that we had deliv-, that the United States had delivered to the Shah?
EM: I don’t really know the details, I don’t really know the details of what it consisted of. No,
the, when we got to the question of, you know, on what basis do we resolve our differences, the
principle we advanced was that if they would restore the hostages to us, we would try to restore

their frozen assets to them. The trouble was that a lot of those assets were in the form of bank
accounts that had been attached by creditors of one kind or another, asserting claims of one kind
or another, so it wasn’t as easy to restore the assets as it was to ask them to restore the hostages.
But that was a basic principle upon which the discussions were based, and to deal with the
claims we agreed to set up a claims tribunal in The Hague to sort through those, I guess literally
thousands of claims, a process that is still ongoing, unless it’s been finally concluded. I don’t
think it has been finally concluded these ten years later.
Anyway, it worked. We were able to return to Iran, I think something like, oh, I forget how
many billion dollars, but that would put some in escrow against these claims, and that was an
agreement I think, or a provision in the agreement that if the amount of escrow money was
exhausted that the Iranians would replenish it. I’d have to go back and look at that agreement.
That’s, it was a pretty technical thing. And Warren Christopher presided over that whole
negotiation at the time. Had to deal with the bankers, had to deal with creditors, had to deal with
the Iranians. Fortunately, you know, the emergence of the electronic transfer of funds made it
possible to implement the agreement in a very short time frame, once the agreement was
reached, because we didn’t have a hell of a lot of time toward the end.
So it was a rather steady progression, you know, from the failed hostage, failed hostage attempt,
decision in order to await political developments in Iran, finally, once there was somebody to
deal with, to communicate with, to make that contact, and then a response, not too late, a month
or so, subsequently that resulted in these indirect negotiations. And I don’t, I can’t remember
how many, how many trips the Algerian emissaries had to take, you know, moving between
Washington and Tehran before the agreement was finally buttoned down. And they were
excellent. They had been involved, the three Algerian emissaries, had been involved in the
negotiations between Algeria and DeGaulle’s government which led to the independence of
Algeria, so they were seasoned diplomats. It was really a pleasure to do business with them.
They sort of filtered, you know, filtered the messages back and forth. They didn’t act as, try to
act as arbitrators, but they simply undertook to filter, where, you know, by eliminating, you
know, the hostile fringes of these exchanges. I thought they did a terrific job.
CB: What was the motive of the Algerian government to get involved in this?
EM: Their motive? Well, I think they were interested in being involved in such a, I mean, it
gave their government visibility. Certainly the Iranians had confidence in them, in selecting
them, so it was a way of maintaining good relationships and maybe improving their relationships
with Iran, and with us. I mean, I think almost any government would have accepted that role if
they felt in a position to do it to lighten the burden for them, and they gained a lot of respect in
this country, from people who counted. I think, I know that Warren Christopher enjoyed the
relationship he established with the Algerians, and I certainly did. And the West Germans were
willing to play the same role. You know, this is not unusual, when you think of some of the
conferences dealing with Southeast Asian issues. Poland has been involved in that sort of thing,
France, Canada. Canada quite often is asked to serve in similar roles. They do so without
reluctance. And you know these countries that send, that send troops in peace keeping
situations, you know, their soldiers are under pressure, in dan-, in risk of their lives. You think
of the United Nations forces that have been in Lebanon, that also served in. . . . (telephone

interruption).
CB: Concerning the Iran hostage crisis, did you, did you or Warren Christopher have any direct
dealings with Iranian emissaries?
EM: No.
CB: You just worked through the Germans, or the Algerians?
EM: Through the Algerians.
CB: When did you sense that there was some kind of breakthrough in the impasse between Iran
and the United States over the hostages?
EM: Well, I think I’ve already indicated that the possibility, I mean, until I had written to the
speaker of the Madulis, there had been nothing to indicate there was a possibility of a break.
And of course when I wrote, I think he disclosed publicly in a press conference the fact that I had
written and, I don’t know, I can’t remember to what extent he revealed the contents of that letter.
But in any case, he was not abusive in his reaction to the letter.
CB: Had you expected him to be abusive?
EM: Well, I mean, you know, the Iranian reaction to anything that the American government
said or did on these subjects took the form of a tirade. They never lost an opportunity to
castigate the great Satan. This was a typical stock in trade. But we didn’t get any of that in
response to my letter. That didn’t generate any false hopes on our part, but it was a matter of
interest. So I guess I would say that the first indication we had that there might be a possibility
down the road of a break was the West German foreign minister’s call to me to tell me about the
signal he had had from the Iranians. And so we responded, we agreed on an exchange of public
statements that were ambiguous but which would indicate that there was indeed genuine contact
between the Iranian government, and Khomeini, and us.
We did that, and from then on, the one setback in that whole process was the weekend before our
election when, when the Iranian Madulis convened and there was a lot of public debate about the
hostages. And we had to go through a weekend of television review of, you know, the burning
of the United States flag and, you know, all the footage that had been generated at the time of the
hostage taking. And that didn’t help Carter’s election chances very much. If they’d kept it quiet,
we might have done better, but, in other words, that was their way, I guess, of indicating publicly
that they were seriously considering the possibility of a resolution. But the language in that
debate didn’t always encourage us to believe that. We couldn’t be sure whether or not their
going through this public demonstration of involvement was for the purpose of helping or
hurting Carter’s chances for reelection.
The Republicans, I guess, like to say, well, I won’t say that because I’m not sure about that. In
any case, whatever their motive was, the effect on the election here in this country was dramatic
as revealed by the polls. I think on the Friday or Saturday before elections, the, it seemed to be

about even, according to the polls, but the election was a walk away. The polls, just before
election day, just showed a dramatic drop in Carter’s prospects. He knew the day, the day
before, the day before election that he had lost, which is a dispiriting thing.
But in any case, after election, we, we made the change in intermediaries and the talks continued
on a continuing basis. At least one exchange a week, I think, as I recall it, one exchange every
two weeks, trying to hammer out the principles and the elements of a resolution. And all this
happened, the messages from Iran always seemed to arrive on a Saturday before the Sunday of
all the talk shows, you know, and I’d usually be scheduled on Meet the Press or Face the Nation,
Issues and Answers, only to have to publicly react to some development, alleged development or
supposed development. The most dramatic was when the Iranians delivered a message which
sounded like a request for a twenty four billion dollar ransom payment. That’s how the press
tended to describe it, and I had to cool that one off. And obviously we did, we never did pay
them anything like twenty-four billion dollars.
CB: Now, did the issue of the return of the Shah himself, or his wealth, come up in negotiations
when you were secretary of state?
EM: I don’t think so. I think the Shah died, let’s see, what is this, I think the date of his death is
in here. Marshall Tito died according, on May 4th. But it didn’t, in any case. I was just trying
to place it and I thought I saw something in here. Ah, July 27th, the Shah dies in Egypt.
CB: So that was, the return of the Shah was a moot issue. What about his assets? Did the
Iranians demand the return of his, because they had alleged that he had salted away quite a bit of
money.
EM: I think they did. Incidentally, on those details, under the auspices of the New York Bar,
Warren Christopher and others who were involved in, the team that we created to deal with all
those issues, resulted in a book, I don’t know if you’ve run into that or not, on the hostage crisis.
Ought to try to get a copy of it for the, because those answers will be found there, and I don’t
want to rely on my memory, but yes, constantly I think the question of the Shah’s assets were,
they cer-, part of the discussion as I recall it.
CB: I have one more question on the Iranian hostage crisis. I was always curious in following
this why the Iranians didn’t release the hostages before the November elections on the grounds
that Ronald Reagan might be more difficult to deal with than Jimmy Carter. Do you have any
sense of why the Iranians kept the hostages until after the election? Indeed, didn’t release them
until the day of the inauguration.
EM: Well, must be that they weren’t impressed by that argument. After all, in that weekend’s
demonstration before election they, although it’s, I’ve said a moment ago that we can’t be sure
whether they were doing that to help or hurt Carter, they couldn’t have done anything more
likely to encourage the election of Reagan than that demonstration. So if it was his election that,
that they were worried about, it certainly didn’t affect their behavior that weekend, as far as I can
see. No, the Republicans liked, liked to, some Republicans, I don’t want to blanket them all with
that kind of a statement, but a lot of people were saying at that time that, that Reagan would be

tougher on them than we were, etc. That kind of argument was made but I can’t, I really have no
reason to believe that it affected their attitude in the negotiations. After all, no, I just don’t see
that, Chris.
CB: Okay, turning to another part of the world where you’ve had a recent interest, Southeast
Asia, the, in 1979 Vietnam invaded Cambodia and overthrew the Khmer Rouge regime, which
was supported by the Chinese. The Chinese launched a border, an incursion on Vietnam’s
border, and the position of the Carter administration was in opposition to the Vietnamese
intervention, or the invasion of Cambodia. What were your thoughts at the time, in 1980 when
you entered the State Department, on the Carter administration’s policies towards Southeast
Asia, specifically towards Vietnam?
EM: Well, when I came in as secretary I don’t think the Carter administration had made a
decision. Well, the Carter, the Carter administration’s reaction to the invasion was that it was a
demonstration of the expansionist tendencies of the Vietnamese government. I think that’s a
matter of fact, pure and simple. And I guess that was my reaction as well. The provocation for
the invasion, as I’ve learned since, is that the Khmer Rouge had been launching incursions,
military incursions, bloody incursions into Vietnam across their common border. Now, at the
time, I’m not sure that we gave Vietnam the credit for whatever credit there might be involved in
reaction to those incursions as the motive for their invasion. We tended to believe that it was
simply Vietnam’s historical tendency and, hostility to Cambodia and historical tendency to try to
expand its reach. And that’s what we were against. The fact that in the process the Vietnamese
deposed the Khmer Rouge was not really focused on particularly. I don’t know to what extent
we were aware at that time of the genocide that had taken place. I don’t recall being aware of it
and I don’t think the Western world was aware of it at that time.
CB: Well, there had been reports ...
EM: There had been reports, no question about that, but I don’t, here I’m talking about
something that happened twelve years ago, eleven, twelve years ago, but I don’t think that our
policy was, appropriately took into account that fact. In other words, we didn’t credit Vietnam
with the motive of invading in order to liberate the Cambodian people from the Khmer Rouge. I
don’t think we believed that that was Vietnam’s motive. So it was sort of an incidental result,
whatever awareness we had at the time, that genocide had taken place. Not that we had a very
high opinion of Pol Pot, I don’t think we did, but the fact that in effect the Khmer Rouge and
their murderous regime were deposed was an incidental result of the invasion and not the motive
of the invasion.
And so the result, you know, then the ASEAN countries of course, which have always been
fearful of Vietnam, also saw it as evidence of Vietnamese expansion and these countries, you
know who they are, they are Malaysia, Indonesia, Singapore, the Philippines, Brunei, Thailand,
six of them, they were anxious to get U.S. support for their view of this situation and China was
with them at that time. And so the result was that there was a common agreement on the part of
the ASEAN countries, you know, to recognize the coalition which, I don’t know whether the
coalition was in place in 1980. But the result of it all was that they all supported the idea of
giving the United Nations seat of Cambodia to the Khmer Rouge and the non-communist

coalition. That was their idea of a way to restrain, or to make Vietnam pay a price for its
invasion. And we concurred in that, I think, and I think that decision on our part took place
while I was secretary.
CB: Now the Chinese argued, at least publicly, that the invasion of Cambodia by the
Vietnamese was an extension of Soviet power. Was that a consideration in the formulation of
the U.S. response to the Vietnamese invasion?
EM: Oh, well, I think we still retained the conviction we had throughout the Vietnam War. The
Soviet Union was the principal, although we regarded China as a supporter of the Vietnam-, of
the North Vietnamese, too. We didn’t see it as just a Soviet, I mean, China’s position in this
whole situation has been a shifting one over the centuries. Until about 1000 B.C. I think China
controlled Vietnam, or Indo China as it was then called. I think that’s what it was then called.
And the Vietnamese shook loose from that control for most of the next millennium. It’s rather
strange that during the Vietnam War we regarded China as a supporter of North Vietnam and
since then, of course, China has been a supporter of the Khmer Rouge. It’s both, you know, both
relationships have a deep history that is not fully explainable.
CB: Mentioning the Soviet Union, at this, during the period you were Secretary of State, the
Soviets had, well, before you became, just before you became Secretary of State, the Soviets had
occupied Afghanistan, which had been, of course became a major issue in U.S. - Soviet relations.
And the United States imposed certain sanctions on the Soviet Union and at least enunciated
support for the Afghan, the growing rebellion in Afghanistan. In your opinion, do you, what do
you think was behind the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan? Now, again, there’s a division of
opinion in, one group would argue that the Soviets were simply trying to shore up a tottering
Communist regime that had no basis of support, others argued that this was one step in a long
historic drive by the Soviet Union, the Russians, to gain a foothold in the Middle East, and
particularly foreign water ports. What was your view or response at the time, in 1980, to the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan?
EM: Well, I thought, I think we saw it then as the latter, you know, the latter rationale that you
just stated. And it was that point of view that I presented to Gromyko when we had our first talk
about the whole situation. He was curious as to why we were concerned about it and my answer
to him was that it was the geography of the situation that concerned us. What their actual motive
was, I think you’ve still got to see it in that way.
The Soviets, you know, following WWII, you know, had designs on Iran at that time. As a
matter of fact, we formed the Alliance with Greece and Turkey at the time, our Greece and
Turkey policy under Truman for the purpose of creating a deterrent to Soviet expansion in that
area. So the Soviets historically for a long time had been reaching out toward Iran and we were
concerned about that all through my term as secretary, the possibility that the Soviets might
move into Iran. They were, there were troop movements, troop buildups along that border while
we were, during that period, at the same time that there were buildups along the Polish border. I
mean, we were concerned about both and not entirely sure as to which of those perceived options
the Soviets were playing games with. But we certainly felt that they were, and the Afghanistan
invasion could well have been part of a broader objective which included Iran ultimately, and a

warm water port, as you put it. I think that’s about it.
Incidentally, I had an Afghanistan taxi driver in New York yesterday. He promised to turn on
the air conditioning, and appeared to, and then nothing happened and I finally said, your air
condition doesn’t seem to work. He said, my air condition’s working very well. So, where is it?
But in any case, when he dropped me off, I told him who I was and he said, oh, I know, he said,
I’m from Afghanistan. So there you are. Taxi drivers in Washington and New York come from
all over that area, Iranians, Afghanistanis, Pakistanis, and they all recognize me.
CB: Were you afraid that the Soviets would intervene in Poland?
EM: Yes, we were. Definitely we were concerned about that. That was a very, very, an area of
very great concern on the part of all of our NATO allies as well as ourselves. They were all
concerned about it. I remember we, the last meeting we had of NATO foreign ministers in
December of 1980 ...
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CB: There, you were mentioning at the last meeting of NATO foreign ministers, you were
concerned about possible Soviet intervention in Poland. What were, what did the United States
propose to do about it, if that eventuality happened? I mean, what could the United States do
about that?
EM: You mean, what would we ultimately do about that? You know, what you might
ultimately do about such situations is a question that you don’t necessarily decide early on. Just
as at present time in the Persian Gulf. What will we ultimately do? Will we blockade, for
example? Well, the suggestion that we may is certainly raised and left to rest there as a
deterrent. Whether we actually will, you know, you won’t know until you get to that point.
Whether we would have gone into WWIII if they had invaded Poland is a question we never
decided as such, of course. And so what you try to do is to find ways to express the seriousness
of our concern that they appeared to be preparing for that kind of a development, or that kind of
intervention, and their mobilization of forces along the Polish border of course gave grounds for
that concern. And I forget exactly what communique or what position we announced publicly at
that time, as an Alliance, to deter the Russians, but whatever it was it seemed to be sufficient at
the time.
CB: Now, turning to a, closer to home, in 1979 and 1980 the issue of the turmoil in Central
America began to come to the fore. There’d been a revolution in Nicaragua and an incipient
civil war in El Salvador. In December of 1980 four American church women were murdered
and the best evidence suggests that they were murdered by members of the Salvadoran military.
What do you recall about that incident and also, nine days after the murder of the church women,
the opposition Marti front, guerilla front in El Salvador, launched an offensive and the Carter
administration released emergency funds to help the Salvadoran government withstand that
offensive. What do you recall in terms of the formulation of U.S. policy towards Central
America, and specifically El Salvador at this time?

EM: Well, we were concerned, as everybody else was then and as people still are concerned in
El Salvador as to whether or not, and to what extent if at all, the military, the right wing military
had been involved in those incidents.
Duarte, Antonio Duarte was a part of the government at that time. I think there was a group, a
junta, and he was a member. But there was always a question as to how much influence he had
or to what extent he was able to deter, you know, the use of these death squads in El Salvador. I
know we undertook to limit the amount and kind of military aid we would give. We tried to
avoid lethal aid at the time, as I remember. Helicopters were I think a special item that we were
concerned about. It’s a fact, of course, that this guerilla war was under way and the question as
to who was supporting the guerillas. I think we were reasonably sure the Nicaraguans were to
some extent, and the Cubans to some extent, and it was our policy to provide the government of
El Salvador with the resources to enable them to resist those incursions. And yet at the same
time there was this concern that the, you know, the right wing, the radical group, were also
involved in that internal struggle for power and then that, it was always difficult to pinpoint the
perpetrators of those crimes. And so we tended to be very cautious about the amount and kind of
military aid we would give.
Now that changed, of course, after the Reagan administration came in. I think they were less
reluctant to provide military assistance. Ultimately Duarte did get elected in his own right as
president. That produced a kind of improved situation thereafter, but that was long after we had
left office. At the time we left office we were, we really hadn’t been able to satisfy ourselves
that the way we were handling the situation was producing anything very constructive. At that
time also, I think, we were supporting an aid program for Nicaragua. I think seventy five million
dollars, something of that kind. The program didn’t look too good, subsequently.
CB: It didn’t look too good in what sense? That it didn’t have an impact on the Sandanista
government, or that it had caused political problems at home?
EM: Well, both.
CB: Now, the purpose of the aid prog-, aid to Nicaragua, was that to exercise some leverage
over the political development of the new regime?
EM: That’s right. It was. I don’t know, I can’t remember whether at that time we had, my
memory really isn’t very good, they had finally prevailed over the Somoza forces, I think they
had, am I correct in that?
CB: Well, the Sandanistas came to power in July of 1979. So they were in there, I mean, they
were in there when you came in to the state department. But I think the government was, the
formal government was in flux. It had been a kind of unstable coalition of Sandanistas and nonSandanista opposition, opponents of Samosa.
EM: But the aid program had been created before I became secretary and ...

CB: How much attention were you able to pay, I mean, this, all this seems to be taking place in
the context of the Iran hostage crisis and negotiations. How much time and attention were you
as secretary able to give to the issues like Central America or Afghanistan or Southeast Asia?
EM: Well, you had to deal with them. Ah, and I’m not sure that we’re able to do so thoroughly,
you know, you haven’t even gotten to the unstability, instability in South Korea which also
plagued us in that period. So we had, you had South Korea, you had all these others that we’ve
touched upon.
No, really, what I think to make these sessions more productive, I think what I need to do is do
some focussed reading to refresh my recollection on the period. I just, I find myself, you know,
too foggy in my recollection about the specifics. I don’t know what the reading sources will be,
or could be, that was somewhat helpful but not fully. I’m not sure that that’s accurate, for
example, and I’m wandering through your last question, but, (reads) “in his first significant
speech the secretary must control the Foreign Policy Association; on July 7th the State
Department placed less stress on human rights issues and provided for essential economic,
social, and military aid to non-Communist nations regardless of its civil rights agenda.” I don’t
remember that speech. I’m going to dig it out when I get back to Washington and see if in effect
that, that’s an accurate one-sentence summary. I find that ...
CB: That does seem like a major change in the Carter adminis-, the thrust of the Carter
administration policy ...
EM: Yeah, I don’t re...
CB: ... because when Carter came into power, I mean came into office, human rights was to be
the keystone of his foreign policy.
EM: Yeah, and I think it was. I don’t remember that. I really need to do some digging, Chris.
CB: Yeah. Okay. I just want to touch on one other area and then get some general reflections
from you concerning the Middle East, other than Iran. The, a couple of issues came, well, one,
obviously one ongoing issue or circumstance or condition was U.S. relations with Israel. The,
before you came into office, President Carter had managed to establish a relationship between
Sadat of Egypt and Begin of Israel. At the time, what are your reflections on U.S. relations with
Israel at the time? Israel, particularly with regard to Israel’s occupation of the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank, it’s relations with the Arab countries, its security needs and so forth?
EM: Well, what we were basically involved in at that time was a continuation of the peace
process which had started with the Camp David Accords. I think we had carried those Accords
to the point where a peace treaty had been entered into between Egypt and Israel. Am I correct
in that recollection?
CB: I believe so, yes.
EM: And the next phase of the Accords were designed to begin a dialogue which would expand

beyond Egypt and Israel and get other Arab states involved in a discussion of issues that
hopefully could be resolved and achieve a resolution of issues involving Israel’s other neighbors,
other than Egypt. So to continue the peace process, which at that point really still involved only
Egypt and Israel. How to lay the foundation, you know, for a broader dialogue including a
broader range of issues that impacted upon other countries. Sol Linowitz, of course, was in
charge of that process, and the American ambassadors to Israel and Egypt. In the case of Egypt
that was, that was Ambassador Atherton and in the case of Israel, Ambassador Lewis, and
they’re both very good. But Israel would do provocative things that would have the effect of
interrupting the talks between Egypt and Israel.
CB: Such as?
EM: Oh, such as, I forget the member of the Knesset, a woman, that introduced a resolution
naming Jerusalem as the capitol of Israel. Now that’s just calculated to inflame Arabian opinion
at any point. Well that wasn’t a government initiative, an Israeli government initiative but neither
did they denounce it. I think they were able to sidetrack it at the time and we were told, as I
recall, that they’d, they would somehow manage to keep it sidetracked. But there was always
the threat, and you know, ultimately after we left office, the government of Israel did itself name
Jerusalem the capitol of Israel. I mean, that was, the status of Jerusalem was an issue that was,
under Camp David Accords, was to be separately discussed and decided after the deliberation
and the involvement of other states, other Arab states. But that dialogue had never begun and
there’s Jewish opinion that wanted to precipitate the decision and. . . . So that had the effect of
repeatedly interrupting the continuity of the peace process and the discussions between Israel
and Egypt. And it led to votes in the Security Council. There’s some reference to some of those
votes in here, I think, that we abstained, we were able to abstain in many of them, but I think
ultimately we actually voted. . . . I don’t know if that vote is in here. And I forget the resolution.
This is where I get lost in these discussions. I don’t remember the, but in any case, I think
ultimately on one resolution we did not abstain, but voted for the resolution, if my memory is
correct, and Begin was very unhappy with me about that.
But those were never any personal decisions that I made, I mean, they were the result of
discussions that involved the president, the vice president, Mondale, and our ambassador to the
United Nations. But our interest was in keeping the dialogue going, the peace process dialogue
going, and it was damn frustrating, you know, to get these domestic political developments in
Israel that had the effect of interrupting those. Because Linowitz was making some progress we
thought, at the time, on the broader agenda, and was constantly frustrated by the inability to
continue to establish some continuity. I didn’t, it’s not, those are not all covered adequately in
that summary, but that’s an interesting review in its own right. And there was a lot of that that
took place at that time. And we managed to keep it afloat, but, you know, I mean Sadat
obviously was put in a box every time they did this sort of thing, Begin had his own internal
problems with his of-, I mean, it’s a mess.
CB: Now, what was to be the, or what were your thoughts at the time on the status of
Palestinians, both those in the occupied territories and those living as refugees in places abroad
because that, their ultimate status, whether they’re to have a homeland or a state or whatever,
always seemed to be the major issue, at least it was for. . . .

EM: An ever present issue that nobody has ever satisfactorily resolved, nor has any formula
ever been, and I don’t recall that American policy ever adopted any ultimate position as to what
the Palestinian status ought to be. And it was just hoped, I think, that, well, not hoped. I think
part of the purpose of the Camp David Accords was to bring the issues that would bear upon that
ultimate resolu-, the ultimate resolution of that question, and to focus in the context of related
issues such as, I mean, the Camp David Accords were perceived I think as the beginning of an
evolutionary process. A process of evolution that would finally bring the parties into a healthier
relationship and one that would suggest the final answer to the status of the Palestinians.
I don’t think we ever tried to impose our own, you know, a formula of our own on anybody. I
don’t think we were ever sure of what that ought to be, and I don’t think we, to this day, that our
government has any established position on what the status of the Palestinians ought to be. With
the Intefada and this violence that has sprung up over the last few years, it’s pretty difficult to
find, come up with an answer to it. I don’t have an answer. A separate state? A confederation
of some kind involving Jordan and the West Bank? I mean, there have been so many attempts to
come up with a formula that just don’t generate universal approval or support. The situation
over there now seems worse than it was when we left office.
CB: Was there any consideration of bringing the Palestine Liberation Organization into any
negotiations?
EM: Oh, no, I mean, that policy was, so long as the Palestinians did not recognize the right of
the State of Israel to exist, we didn’t do business with them. That policy did not change until
very recently. When was it, last year? Yes? Last year that we began talking with them. And
now I think those talks are in suspension. And now, given. . . . given Arafat’s support of Iraq,
you know, in this present crisis in the Middle East, I don’t think there’ll be a resumption of those
talks for awhile.
CB: I’d like to wrap this up with something that historians I think like to do more for, to get a
handle on things, is kind of ask you a ‘what if’ question. That is to say, if Jimmy Carter had
been reelected in November 1980 and, I’m assuming you would have stayed on as Secretary of
State for a good while, what areas, or what, let’s put it this way: what do you see the major areas
for taking initiatives, or major areas of concern once, particularly once the Iran hostage crisis had
been resolved, and how would you have conducted the foreign policy of the United States
different from the policy of the Reagan administration in its first term?
EM: Oh, God.
CB: That’s a big question.
EM: How do you answer a question like that? I mean, I don’t even have at the top of my mind,
you know, the, the, the developing status of foreign policy problems and issues beginning back
then. I mean, there’s certainly points of differences that I can recall. You know, the attitude
about arms control, the attitude about the SALT II Treaty, for example. Reagan never at any
point, at any point, officially denounced the SALT II Treaty. I think its status was, as best I can

recall, was the decision to observe the treaty without ratifying it, and ultimately four or five years
down the road he rejected it. Then roughly the same time, no, earlier than that, he announced the
strategic defense initiative designed to build this outer space shield against nuclear weapons.
So there are plenty of points of difference that I took with him, publicly and otherwise. And at
one point I worked with Nixon and Howard Baker and Jim Baker to try to launch a visit to the
Soviet Union. A Muskie-Nixon, or Nixon-Muskie visit to try to, you know, probe the
possibilities of a resumption of strategic talks. It was about that time that Reagan himself
changed his own view about the importance of arms control talks and he initiated his own at that
time.
Well, what the hell good is it going to do me to try to reconstruct in my mind how that period
would have changed, been different if I’d been there. I mean, I was for the SALT II Treaty, I
was for arms control, I was chairman of the Arms Control Sub-Committee of the Foreign
Relations Committee when I was in the Senate, and so I was interested in the arms control
process. And I was opposed to the strategic defense initiative because I, number one, I didn’t
think it could work, I didn’t think there was any way to make it work, and I never heard a
scientist argue that it was possible. But that’s all history now. Now we’re in a different ball
game and I assume that finally the strategic defense initiative is, I guess we’re still providing
some money to continue, continue the research. I suspect that won’t last very long. I can’t
believe that with all the budgetary constraints that we have to meet today that that program will
last very long in the present context of east - west relations. So I don’t know how you deal with
that question.
In Nicaragua I took issue with the administration handling of that situation. You know, things
like the mining of Nicaraguan harbors, the renunciation of the, of the ah, of the ah, compulsory
jurisdiction of the World Court, and other issues that flowed out of that situation, I disagreed
with the administration. But it’s very hard to say where we would be now if a different road than
that the Reagan administration chose to travel had been traveled. It’s very difficult to do.
So I would say we would have differed on arms control, we would have differed on the handling
of the Central American situation. Once the administration embraced the arms control thing,
then I’d have to give the administration credit for its shift in policy and the results that followed,
although Reagan never did concede that SDI should be terminated. And you think back now,
you know, on what, at what the defense spending of that decade did to our budgetary problems,
the national deficit, and our ability today to, you know, to play a more effective, productive role
in Eastern Europe, for example, and in Cambodia. We don’t have the resources to do the things
that we’ve been, we’ve said we’ve been wanting to do all this time, in large part because I think
of excessive spending for defense. And yet there will always be a historical argument as to
whether or not the change in the Russian perception of the east - west relationship was effected
by that defense buildup on our part. My own view is that, that the So-, the problems with the
Soviet economy were a greater factor than, maybe exacerbated by the amount of their defense
spending. But nevertheless, I think that motivated Gorbachev in a way that might have
motivated him even if our level of defense spending had been less.
And then there’s a whole question of whether or not, you know, the money we spent on defense,

on the defense posture, on the defense structure, that we’ve bought with all that money is
relevant to problems like that in the Persian Gulf at the present time. I doubt very much, you
know, that the stealth bomber has much to do with the power that we project in the Middle East
now, or the Trident submarine. In other words, the defense buildup, the emphasis of the defense
buildup doesn’t seem very relevant to the needs of today. Problems of Eastern Europe, the
threat, the dangers of the Persian Gulf, so there you are. You can second guess until the cows
come home and you can’t be sure that you would have been right.
CB: One last question, this sort of gets beyond the Secretary of State period. What’s your, what
is your view on the recent events in the Middle East, particularly President Bush’s response in
sending large numbers of U.S. forces over there?
EM: Well, I, my view is that he’s on target. I think he’s done what he had to do. I don’t,
whether some lesser level of deterrents would deter Saddam, we’re not sure that what Bush has
done will deter him. No, I take no exception to what he’s done. Now, that doesn’t mean that I
have any certainty that the ultimate result will be a resolution of the, of the confrontation. My
own feeling is that Saddam has, you know, Saddam’s objectives haven’t changed one iota at all,
you know. His timing may; he may decide that he can’t do what he might otherwise had
planned to do. If he had planned to invade Saudi Arabia, he may be deterred from that. Whether
or not he can be persuaded to pull back out of Kuwait, he’s already plundered Kuwait, I think,
pretty decisively with, you know, with electronic transfer of wealth. I suspect he has really
stolen Kuwait blind in the weeks that he’s been there. I think he must have been concentrating
on transferring that Kuwaiti wealth in any way that he can to his own bank account, figuratively
speaking. No, I think he has long wanted to be the dominant Arab figure, the dominant Arab
leader in the Gulf. Number one because he’s hungry for power, number two, that would give
him control of the oil resources of the Gulf area which would give, make him a, you know, a
very disturbing force in the world economy. I think all of that’s what he’s been wanting to do.
I think he has long coveted, not just the oil well, the oil resources that he shared with Kuwait, but
Kuwait itself. I think he has always argued that Kuwait was once a part of Iraq and should be a
part of Iraq again. I don’t think he’s given up that objective simply because we’ve moved these
forces in. He may be deterred from staying there for the time being, but if he moved out, you
know, he would simply be awaiting another day. And of course he has indicated his
determination to become a nuclear power. That makes him an even more frightful risk down the
road. Chemical weapons and all of that. I think he’s just one of those figures that history
produces from time to time whose hunger for power, all that can bring, as he perceives it, you
know, makes him virtually immune to any change. No, I think we’re in a very bad pickle. And
what will we do, I mean, you will begin to get disagreements now as various options for
avoiding war, or the possibility of war, are presented to Bush by King Hussein, by Saddam, and
now this initiative toward Iran, what will that do? Well, Iran, what will Iran’s attitude be? And
these economic sanctions? All very interesting.
CB: Okay, well, thank you very much, Secretary Muskie, I really appreciate this. I think that
has been, this has been very informative in filling out a ...
EM: I think we’ve got to make them more productive, I don’t know.

End of Interview
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